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A decade after the global financial crisis, agreement on appropriate policy 
responses to banking crises remains elusive despite an apparent political consensus on 
the need to eliminate bailouts and end “too big to fail” (Binham, 2017). Furthermore, 
many experts doubt that measures adopted since 2008 to limit taxpayer-funded 
rescues will achieve this objective (Admati & Hellwig 2013; Bernanke, Geithner, & 
Paulson, 2019; King, 2016). Meanwhile, elected governments, most recently in Italy, 
continue to implement costly bailouts regardless.  
However, the commonplace explanation that bailouts are the consequence of 
pressure from financial sector interests is not the whole story (Barofsky, 2012; 
Johnson & Kwak, 2010).1 We argue that the emergence of “great expectations” 
among a large segment of society regarding financial stabilization has been a critical 
but overlooked factor driving long term changes in government responses to banking 
crises towards increasingly extensive and costly bailouts. This evolution in the policy 
expectations of households and voters has been driven by three interrelated 
developments: the financialization of wealth, the democratization of leverage, and 
accumulating ex ante government policy commitments to financial stabilization. 
These developments have increasingly linked the interests of middle class 
households2 to financial markets and thereby broadened and intensified their effective 
demand for protection from the fallout from crises.  
Utilizing a new dataset that codes policy responses for 58 democracies in 112 
systemic banking crises since 1848, we provide the first statistical analysis of 
government policy responses to banking crises over such an extended time-frame and 
a large sample of systemic crises. Our findings are consistent with the claim that the 
wealth effect has generated a rising tendency towards bailouts. They relate to other 
studies suggesting that deepening ties to asset markets now challenge, if not supplant, 
                                                     
1
 For more nuanced discussions of financial sector influence on bailouts, see (Bell & 
Hindmoor, 2015; Culpepper & Reinke, 2014). 
2
 We follow others in defining the middle class as “those [households] ‘comfortably’ 
clear of being at-risk-of-poverty” but not those households who have sufficient wealth 
not to need to work (Atkinson & Brandolini, 2013, p. 79). In many contemporary 
democracies with full adult enfranchisement this group constitutes a majority of 
potential voters. 
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those with the labour market as the dominant economic cleavage in politics (Ansell, 
2014; Callaghan, 2015; Harmes, 2001; Langley, 2014). They also extend work 
emphasizing how this “democratization of finance”, often associated with a new 
policy narrative of individual self-responsibility for embracing and managing life 
cycle risks, has a tendency to disappoint (Erturk, Froud, Johal, Leaver & Williams, 
2007; Langley, 2009). Voters strongly resist the idea that they should accept personal 
responsibility for wealth losses in an era of great expectations. 
Our findings are inconsistent with the argument that “democratic 
governments, constrained as they are by links of electoral accountability, are more 
cautious in implementing costly policies that are ultimately shouldered by taxpayers” 
(Rosas, 2009, p. 4).3 This claim overlooks the dynamic forces we identify that have 
weakened the democratic constraint on bailouts. Great expectations effectively place 
modern governments under a very different standard of democratic accountability by 
requiring them to compromise minimizing taxpayer liability in systemic banking 
crises in favour of bailouts aimed at wealth protection. They thus raise doubts 
concerning the general claim that democratic institutions promote fiscal credibility 
(North & Thomas, 1973; North & Weingast, 1989).  
In the next section we elaborate our argument. We then present the new 
dataset and the results of our statistical analysis. We conclude by considering the 
implications for how we can understand evolving political cleavages.  
1 Banking crises and policy responses in democracies 
We can conceptualize policy responses to banking crises as mapping onto an 
abstract continuum ranging from no government intervention to complete government 
socialization of all banking sector losses. We label the first pole of this continuum the 
Market pole and the second the Socialization pole. Both poles are ideal types and in 
practice policy responses often fall between them, approximating what Rosas (2009) 
summarized as “Bagehot” and “Bailout” (Figure 1).  
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 See also (Ferejohn, 1986; Keefer, 2007). 
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Figure 1. Conceptualizing Policy Responses to Banking Crises 
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A “Bagehot” model conforms with Walter Bagehot’s doctrine of crisis 
resolution, which called for central banks to provide lender of last resort facilities 
(LOLR) to solvent banks by “freely advancing on what in ordinary times is reckoned 
a good security” (Bagehot, 1962, p. 97). Such lending should be unlimited but at 
“penalty” interest rates in return for good collateral, to ensure that the government 
was not subsidizing banks in need.  
Bagehot defined bank solvency in reference to “ordinary times” to indicate 
that the LOLR is needed only when there is some uncertainty about solvency and 
implies the possibility of taxpayer loss (Goodhart, 1999, pp. 347–52). LOLR support 
diverges from the pure Market pole in that it involves policy intervention to prevent 
ordinarily solvent and illiquid banks from failing. It places the burden of permanent 
insolvency on banks, their shareholders and related creditors rather than on taxpayers 
and thus can also entail enforcing the closure of insolvent banks, forcing write-downs 
of banks’ non-performing loans (NPLs), permitting their recapitalization by private 
investors, and protecting few if any depositors.  
A “Bailout” response falls closer to the Socialization pole since it involves the 
use of taxpayer resources that delay the closure of banks that are almost certainly 
insolvent in “normal” times. Even so, since these policies may entail some bank 
closures or private sector losses, they often differ from the pure Socialization pole. 
Thus, the main conceptual differences between a Bagehot and a Bailout policy 
response lies in the intention of the government in providing support to banks, in the 
targets of support, and ultimately in the willingness to impose (in the latter case) a 
much higher probability of loss on taxpayers.  
Which factors shape the actual policy choices governments make during 
crises? We focus on the role of competing societal preferences under democratic 
competition. Arguments that democracy curbs bailouts privilege the role of taxpayer 
interests, assuming that governments try to resolve bank insolvency at minimum 
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fiscal cost, resisting narrow interests favouring the socialization of their losses (Rosas, 
2009). Public sector beneficiaries also have a broad interest in minimizing the fiscal 
cost of banking crisis interventions to avoid austerity. Both groups have grown in 
relative size since the early twentieth century with the expansion of the national tax 
base and the welfare state.  
However, we expect relatively weak support for Bagehot policies from these 
groups. First, bailout costs are widely distributed (Rosas, 2009, p. 8). By contrast, the 
benefits of bailouts — as well as the costs of Bagehot policies that might be imposed 
— are relatively concentrated. Second, since the full costs of bailouts are often highly 
uncertain in the short term, those actors who might lose from them often do not face 
strong incentives to oppose them at the time of adoption. Third, even those actors 
with most to lose often have composite interests as savers, investors and (sometimes) 
firms, diminishing their incentives to oppose bailouts. Fourth, elites might reduce 
opposition to bailouts by arguing that only by intervening in the short term can longer 
term public costs be minimized.  
We argue that the wealth effect has given much of the middle class stronger 
interests in and, importantly, preferences for bailout policies during crises.4 The 
primary driver of the evolution in middle class household interests has been the 
spectacular long run growth in this sector’s wealth and its increasing connection to 
complex financial markets. Bank failures not only threaten those with deposits in 
distressed banks, they also now potentially affect a much wider group holding market-
traded assets such as housing and pensions. In describing these changing interests, we 
distinguish between a size effect — rising average household wealth — and a 
composition effect — rising exposure to market-traded assets and growing financial 
inclusion, including via leverage. Finally, we argue that evolving government policy 
commitments, changing knowledge and media commentary, and political 
opportunism have all helped to modify voters’ policy preferences — in summary, 
creating “great expectations.”  
1.1 The financialization of wealth 
Households and firms have become increasingly dependent on the many 
services provided by major banks at the core of the financial network. Savers, 
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 See also (Pagliari, Phillips, & Young, 2018). 
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especially in developed countries, have steadily accumulated wealth that is 
increasingly connected with financial markets, including bank deposits, stocks, bonds 
and houses (Crouch, 2009; Finlayson, 2009; Langley, 2009; Muellbauer, 2008, pp. 
293–94; Nesvetailova & Palan 2013; Watson, 2007). As household wealth portfolios 
have shifted towards more volatile, market-traded assets such as leveraged housing 
equity and defined contribution (DC) pensions, householder anxiety concerning the 
value of their total wealth has likely increased over time (Watson, 2007). Even in 
emerging and developing countries, rising financial inclusion has linked a larger 
proportion of the population to the financial system (Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper, 
2012; World Bank, 2014). Financialization has also been connected to changing 
welfare provision, the acquisition of status goods such as housing, rising inequality 
and growing reliance on credit (Ahlquist & Ansell, 2017; Frank, 2013; Rajan, 2012). 
In short, households now have far more to lose from financial crashes.  
 Figures 2a and 2b, which use available data to plot real net private wealth per 
capita wealth in many advanced and some emerging market economies, shows just 
how dramatic the increase in average real private sector wealth — the size effect — 
has been since 1970 for many countries.5   
                                                     
5
 South Africa outlier status in Figure 1b before 1994 reflects the rising political and 
economic costs of apartheid (Aron, Muellbauer, & Prinsloo, 2008).  
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Figure 2a. Net Private Real Wealth per Capita in Advanced Countries, PPP 
Exchange Rates and Constant 2016 US dollars, 1850 – 2016 
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Figure 2b. Net Private Real Wealth per Capita in Emerging Countries, PPP 
Exchange Rates and Constant 2016 US dollars, 1975 – 2016 
 
Source: World Wealth & Income Database, 2017 
 
Long run estimates of wealth shares are unfortunately very sparse but those 
available suggest that wealth was highly concentrated before 1940. Piketty and Saez 
estimate that in the 70 years following 1870, the wealthiest ten percent of households 
owned between 70 and 90 percent of all wealth in Europe and the United States, with 
the middle 40 percent of wealth holders (the 50th to 90th percentiles of the wealth 
distribution) owning less than five percent (Piketty & Saez, 2014, p. 839).6 Extreme 
wealth concentration meant that the richest decile was far more vulnerable than other 
groups to asset price collapses in the aftermath of banking crises. However, available 
evidence indicates that although wealth remained very unequally distributed 
thereafter, the share and the aggregate wealth holdings of the middle class in 
advanced economies expanded dramatically after the interwar period. Similarly, in 
India, the only non-advanced democracy with repeated household wealth surveys in 
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 See also Ohlsson, Roine, & Waldenström, 2008.  
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the post-war era, the middle class share has more than doubled since the 1980s 
(Subramanian & Jayaraj, 2008). This evidence is corroborated by sharp increases in 
rates of home ownership and pensions in many countries since 1945, suggesting 
strongly that the real increases in per capita wealth indicated in Figure 2 substantially 
accrued to the middle class. 
Middle class wealth portfolios are also subject to growing risk — the 
composition effect. Home ownership rates rose substantially over the course of the 
twentieth century, especially among the middle class (European Central Bank, 2013, 
2016; Guiso, Haliassos, Jappelli & Claessens, 2003; Jordà, Schularick, & Taylor, 
2017; Kuhn, Schularick, & Steins, 2017; Piketty & Zucman, 2014, pp. 1280–81; 
United Nations Human Settlements Program, 2006). Middle class wealth in emerging 
countries is also concentrated in housing, though increasingly too in bank deposits 
and in some cases riskier market-traded assets (Aron, Muellbauer, & Prinsloo, 2008; 
European Central Bank, 2013, 2016; Honohan, 2008; Subramanian & Jayaraj, 2008; 
Torche & Spilerman 2008).  
By the early 2000s, the proportion of households in advanced countries with 
direct or indirect ownership of stocks had grown significantly, reaching nearly 50 
percent in the United States, roughly one-third in Britain and the Netherlands, and 
nearly one-fifth in France, Germany and Italy (Guiso et al., 2003, p. 9). Ownership of 
riskier financial assets among households in advanced economies increases 
significantly from the fifth decile of wealth distribution upward, as does the share of 
such assets in the overall wealth portfolio (European Central Bank, 2016, p. 28). This 
is especially true in emerging markets and developing countries, where (based on the 
limited data available) holdings of risky financial assets below the top five percent of 
wealth-holders are probably often negligible (Honohan, 2008).  
The pension assets of the middle class have grown sharply in many countries 
since 1945. Furthermore, since the 1970s, there has been a growing policy trend 
toward promoting private pensions (Brooks, 2005, 2007; OECD, 2015) and more 
recently a move away from defined benefit (DB) pensions towards DC schemes. 
These policies shift financial risk onto individuals and increase their incentive to 
monitor the market value of their pension assets (Pallares-Miralles, Whitehouse, & 
Romero, 2012).  
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Finally, a sizeable fraction of wealth is still held in bank deposits, which have 
also grown significantly in advanced, emerging and developing economies since the 
1970s — though in the latter two cases the aggregate levels lag considerably behind 
those attained in advanced countries (Figures 3a, 3b). Among advanced countries, a 
downward trend in the relative weight of deposits in household portfolios is evident 
since the 1970s, with a corresponding shift toward riskier assets (Federal Reserve 
Board (U.S.), 2017). In emerging and developing countries, access to financial 
institutions and private credit to GDP ratios have generally risen since the 1970s, 
implying a corresponding increase in the share of households with accounts at 
financial institutions (Svirydzenka, 2016; World Bank, 2015). 
 
Figure 3a. Total Domestic Deposits by Non-Financial Residents / GDP in Advanced 
Economies, 1870 – 2010 
 
Source: Jordà et al., 2017 
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Figure 3b. Total Financial System Deposits / GDP in Emerging Market and 
Developing Country Democracies, 1960 – 2010 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017 
 
1.2 The democratization of leverage 
Rising household leverage has also heightened many voters’ interest in 
financial stabilization. Increasingly, lower and middle-income households borrow to 
finance consumer purchases. Mortgage lending grew especially rapidly after 1945 in 
advanced countries (Figure 4), aptly described as “the democratization of leverage” 
(Jordà, Schularick, & Taylor, 2014). By 2011, the median share of mortgages in 
household debt for a broad set of countries was about 70 percent (Cerutti, Dagher, & 
Dell’Ariccia, 2015). Credit dependence among households in many emerging and 
developing countries has also grown, though levels remain considerably below those 
in advanced economies (Badev, Beck, Vado, & Walley, 2014; Beck, Berrak, Rioja, & 
Valev, 2012; and see Figures 5a and 5b). 
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Figure 4. Total Bank Lending and Mortgage Lending in Advanced Democracies, 
1870 – 2010 
 
Source: Jordà, Schularick, & Taylor, 2014 
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Figure 5a. Private Sector Credit and Household Debt in Emerging Markets, 1960 – 
2015 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, 2017b; Léon, 2017; World Bank, 2017 
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Figure 5b. Private Sector Credit and Household Debt in Developing Countries, 1960 
– 2015  
  
Source: Bank for International Settlements, 2017b; Léon, 2017; World Bank, 2017 
  
Greater access to credit has come at the significant cost of rising household 
leverage and financial fragility, with a risk of substantial wealth losses if asset prices 
fall (Admati & Hellwig, 2013; Goodhart & Erfurth, 2014; International Monetary 
Fund, 2017; Jordà, Schularick, & Taylor, 2015, 2016). In advanced countries, lower 
and middle income households of pre-retirement age are most dependent on credit to 
acquire housing assets and to maintain consumption, while those in emerging markets 
and developing countries increasingly rely upon it to purchase marketized and 
expensive services, such as education and healthcare (Frank, 2013, chap. 5; Kuhn, 
Schularick, & Steins, 2017; Offer, 2014; Raghuram, 2010). Processes of 
financialization and rising leverage common to many economies mean such 
households now have a stronger interest in the bailouts that would maintain the flow 
of credit during and following a crisis.  
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1.3 From interests to Great Expectations 
Do middle class voters perceive government policy interventions as a means 
to protect the value of their assets during crises? Have they gradually acquired 
corresponding policy preferences that induce governments to respond with more 
bailouts? We think it is plausible that such preferences emerged after the 1930s and 
especially during the era of financialization. This claim is no less plausible than the 
common assumption in the economic voting literature that voters understand that 
unemployment affects their welfare and that governments have the means to manage 
business cycles. Indeed, much is now at stake for many modern middle class 
households, who have simultaneously acquired highly leveraged housing equity and 
large at-risk pension assets while facing large and uncertain future healthcare, 
retirement and other liabilities. This has prompted rising middle class anxiety, 
deepening, as Watson (2007:3) puts it, “the impression that more is now a stake than 
ever before when the pricing structure of financial markets looks likely to break 
down.” The argument that this strongly influences political choices is consistent with 
the growing literature on “patrimonial voting,” which finds that asset ownership does 
shape voter preferences (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, & Foucault, 2013; Persson & 
Martinsson, 2018).  
There are further reasons for this expectation beyond the specific 
circumstances of increasingly vulnerable households. As financial firm size and 
interconnectedness have grown, the ability of private sector actors to support 
insolvent banks has diminished. This has left the state, with its greater taxation and 
borrowing capacity, as the residual guarantor in a systemic crisis. Moreover, the 
experience of deep banking crises and policy mismanagement in the 1930s led to new 
understandings about the role of government in financial stabilization (Berman, 2006; 
Eichengreen, 1992). Before the mid-twentieth century, most governments made very 
limited if any policy commitments to promote financial stability (Grossman, 2010; 
Schenk, 2016). After this time, governments made explicit pledges to voters to take 
new measures to stabilize the financial sector, including prudential regulation and 
implicit commitments arising from extensive state control of the banking system 
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(Allen, Cope, Dark, & Witheridge, 1938; Busch, 2009; Helleiner, 1994, pp. 25–50).7 
These new policy orientations also visibly worked. The virtual absence of banking 
crises in the three decades after 1945 likely reinforced voter expectations of financial 
stability as a politically achievable condition.  
Although it would be unrealistic to expect that most voters understood the 
technical details of innovations in financial stabilization policy, it is not unreasonable 
to believe that they took notice of this broad policy reorientation and the high level of 
financial stability in the three postwar decades when substantial assets were being 
accumulated. The rapid expansion of secondary and tertiary education rates for 
middle class adults in these decades provides one reason (Lee & Lee, 2016).  
More importantly, we need not assume high levels of sophistication for most 
voters. At least as much as in “normal” recessions, the media and opportunistic 
politicians have strong incentives to seize on rising voter anxieties about threats to 
their wealth to focus their attention on government policy responsibilities during 
systemic banking crises. Kayser and Peress (2012) have pointed to how the media and 
opposition politicians provide voters facing falls in employment income during 
recessions with easily digestible benchmarking of national policy and economic 
outcomes relative to other countries. To the extent policy benchmarking also occurs 
during banking crises, it could promote spatial policy diffusion, a possibility we 
address in the empirical analysis.  
Is there evidence to support our argument that modern voters have acquired 
great expectations? National household surveys undertaken in multiple waves in the 
United Kingdom from 2003 to 2007 showed that over 55% of respondents with an 
opinion on the matter held the view that, in a crisis, the authorities would bail out 
some or all failing financial firms (Financial Services Authority (UK), 2009, p. 26). A 
potential problem in interpreting these results is that some respondents may have 
expected bailouts because of the economic and political importance of Britain’s 
financial sector rather than reflecting personal preference. However, when first asked 
in 2007 to explain this view, the main reason (18%) given was “too many consumers 
would be affected” in addition to “people would lose confidence in the financial 
                                                     
7
 Political parties also made such pledges in elections. For interwar and early postwar 
examples, see Chwieroth & Walter 2019, chapter 2 and 273–274. 
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system” (6%) and “government would never allow consumers to lose money” (5%). 
Similarly, a Dutch survey in 2010 also found that nearly two-thirds of respondents 
agreed that supervisors must ensure that banks never go bankrupt. It is arguably more 
revealing of individual preferences that three-quarters of respondents incorrectly 
assumed that supervisors will refund any deposits when a bank goes bankrupt. A 
substantial majority (59%) also believed that supervisors had to ensure swift 
reimbursement of guaranteed savings when a bank fails. Whereas 80% of respondents 
expected reimbursal in three days, the average repayment period in the Netherlands is 
three months (van der Cruijsen, Jansen, & Mosch, 2013, 228). 
Another potential problem with such survey results is that they could reflect a 
general expectation of rising government intervention in market economies. However, 
this possibility is not reflected in the multiple waves of the cross-national World 
Values Survey since 1981, which do not indicate a general rising trend among 
respondents that governments will intervene more (see online appendix). 
Furthermore, Ansell finds evidence that homeowners experiencing house price 
appreciation generally become less supportive of redistribution and social insurance 
policies (Ansell, 2014). This suggests that the shift in voter expectations we identify 
may be issue-specific and due more to the wealth effect we emphasize. 
Elsewhere, we also undertook an extensive coding of the content of national 
newspaper editorials discussing government policy options during systemic banking 
crises since the nineteenth century in three countries (Brazil, the United Kingdom and 
the United States). This reveals two important findings consistent with our argument: 
first, that there was a rising tendency for editorialists to discuss intra-crisis policy 
interventions over the course of the twentieth century, and second, that in all three 
countries they shifted from a stance of supporting market-conforming/Bagehot 
policies to favouring bailouts (Chwieroth & Walter, 2019, pp. 118–160). Such 
commentary can both reflect and inform voter opinion. A recent study of British 
media coverage of the 2007–2009 crisis found that while “many people struggled to 
understand the crisis…the media were important in establishing [key] aspects of 
audience belief such as the view that the part-nationalisations [of banks] had been the 
‘only option’ and that the key issue was reforming bankers’ pay structures” (Berry, 
2019, p. 111). Policy benchmarking by the media in modern crises also seems 
considerable. As one indication, Kayser and Peress (2012, p. 681) provide evidence 
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that benchmarked post-crisis economic performance accounts for the surprising fact 
that some incumbent parties increased their vote share during the 2008–2009 financial 
crisis.  
In addition, opportunistic politicians in recent crises highlighted the role of 
government in financial stabilization during modern banking crises far more than in 
pre-1945 crises. For example, in the United Kingdom over 2007–2008, the opposition 
Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties moved quickly to support public 
intervention to stabilize the financial system while distancing themselves from the 
banks and criticizing the government for the ineffectiveness and unfairness of their 
policies (Darling, 2011, pp. 54, 68, 174). This was also true of the Democrats in the 
United States under the George W. Bush administration, where majority public 
opinion supported financial stabilization measures but — as in Britain — also 
reflected strong resentment at the need to rescue wealthy bankers 
(PewResearchCenter, 2008; Smith, 2014, p. 105). This prompted a direct appeal to 
voters by Bush, who said that although he understood why ordinary people abhorred a 
bailout, “not passing a bill now would cost these Americans much more later” (New 
York Times, 2008). Members of Congress began receiving calls from constituents 
concerned about their life savings, which seems to have induced some to support the 
revised bill (Geithner, 2015, p. 221; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2013, pp. 234–
237; Morales, 2008).8 By contrast, most opposition Democrats in the deep 1907 US 
crisis opposed government financial stabilization measures.9 Even as late as 1931–
1932, Congressional Democrats were mainly pushing measures to encourage the 
Federal Reserve to provide liquidity consistent with the Bagehot rule (Meltzer, 2010, 
p. 347).  
Thus, there is considerable evidence to support our expectation that elected 
politicians have come to understand that many voters now have a strong stake in 
financial stability, expect stabilization measures in crises, but are also very attentive 
to the perceived fairness of interventions. With these changed expectations, voter 
                                                     
8
 Consistent with our argument, household exposure to stock market risk increased 
support for TARP among middle class and wealthier households (Pagliari, Phillips, & 
Young, 2018). 
9
 Excepting calls from some representatives from the South and West for depositor 
protection (Congressional Record, vol. 42, 29 May 1908, appendix, p. 468). 
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assessments of government competence plausibly also became more closely 
associated with the provision of financial stability.  
Our argument does not depend on the empirical claim that crises have become 
deeper over time. By investigating systemic crises of a similar potential magnitude in 
our empirical analysis, we seek to rule out this possibility. Nevertheless, rising 
financialization and leverage have probably had the additional effect of intensifying 
banking crises by increasing systemic risk, shifting voter support further towards 
bailouts.  
2 Government Policy Responses: Conceptualization and Measurement  
 Previous analyses of bank bailouts largely investigate either fiscal cost 
measurements (Gandrud & Hallerberg, 2015; Grossman & Woll, 2014; Honohan & 
Klingebiel, 2000; Keefer, 2007) or a limited number of policy responses (Culpepper 
& Reinke, 2014; Weber & Schmitz, 2011). These modelling decisions may not 
always be appropriate. Fiscal costs can take many years to be determined, some 
policy responses generate uncertain contingent liabilities (Gandrud & Hallerberg, 
2015), and they are influenced by economic outcomes that flow from policy choices. 
The drawback of limiting the focus to a narrow set of policy indicators is that 
government responses to crises typically encompass a wide range of policies that can 
be substitutes or complements.  
Thus, like Rosas, we classify different microeconomic policy measures 
according to whether they prevent insolvent banks from failing (bailouts) or instead 
support only illiquid banks, ensuring that insolvent bank losses are crystallized and 
borne by their investors, other creditors and employees (Bagehot measures). Our aim 
is to measure the overall tendency for governments to conform to either ideal type in 
their response to banking crises. We identify five policy areas crucial to classifying 
policy responses: Liquidity Support, Liability Resolution, Asset Resolution, Bank 
Capitalization, and Bank Exit.  
Table 1 briefly summarizes in each case the response that a government 
pursuing a coherent Bagehot or Bailout strategy would enact. We provide more detail 
in the online appendix. The leftmost column identifies the five policy areas. The 
entries in the inner two columns respectively describe policy measures consistent with 
a Bagehot or Bailout strategy. Entries in the rightmost column refer to the binary 
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indicators used for each policy area.   
For these indicators we draw on and greatly extend the dataset compiled by 
Honohan and Klingebiel — also the principal data source for Rosas — who compile 
and code government policy responses to crises observed during 1970 – 2000 
(Honohan & Klingebiel, 2000).10 Using a wider range of sources, we code policies 
consistent with the Bailout ideal type as “+1” and code those policies consistent with 
the Bagehot ideal type as “-1.” Liquidity Support, for instance, is coded as +1 where 
we observe indiscriminate, uncollateralized, open-ended, or subsidized liquidity 
support consistent with a Bailout response. As another example, Liability Resolution 
is coded as -1 where we observe losses imposed on depositors consistent with a 
Bagehot response. We consider all policy measures implemented within a three-year 
period after the end of the crisis window, producing an aggregate score that abstracts 
from any variation in policy during the time-window.11 
  
                                                     
10
 These authors consider regulatory forbearance as an additional indicator. Yet 
(Rosas, 2006, pp. 185–186) finds it is a poor determinant of bailout tendencies. Most 
governments opt for forbearance but it is difficult to measure and detect, so we omit it 
in our analysis.  
11
 So, for example, for a country experiencing a crisis over 1907–1908, policy 
responses occurring in the period 1907–1911 would be included. 
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Table 1. Policy Responses to Systemic Banking Crises, Bagehot v. Bailout  
Policy Area Bagehot Bailout Indicator 
Liquidity 
Support 
Authorities lend on 
good collateral at 
penalty rate, for a 
limited duration to 
screened applicants  
Authorities provide 
indiscriminate, 
uncollateralized, open-
ended, or subsidized 
support, as requested by 
banks 
Government provides 
one or more of the 
following: (1) 
uncollateralized lending, 
(2) liquidity support 
larger than total bank 
system capital for at 
least one year, (3) 
liquidity support at 
below market rates, or 
(4) liquidity support to 
applicants requiring 
recapitalization (+1) 
Asset 
Resolution 
Banks required to write 
down the book value of 
distressed assets  
Public sector purchases or 
accepts distressed assets 
 
 
Distressed borrowers are 
provided with debt relief  
Government transfers 
distressed assets to a 
public asset 
management corporation 
(“bad bank) (+1) 
Government sponsors 
debt relief for borrowers 
(+1) 
Bank 
Capitalization 
Banks recapitalized by 
private investors 
Banks recapitalized by 
government 
Government 
recapitalizes or takes 
controlling share of a 
bank (+1) 
Liability 
Resolution 
No additional implicit 
or explicit protection 
extended to liability 
holders 
Implicit or explicit 
protection of major 
categories of liability 
holders 
State-owned institutions 
hold at least 50% of 
assets or 75% of 
deposits (+1) 
 
Government issues 
explicit guarantee of 
non-deposit liability 
holders (+1) 
Government issues new 
or extended explicit 
deposit guarantee (+1) 
Government freezes 
deposits or payments 
from intervened 
financial institutions, or 
declares a bank holiday 
(+1) 
Government imposes 
losses on depositors in 
intervened financial 
institutions (-1) 
Exit Policy Insolvent banks are 
restructured or closed  
Banks understood to be 
insolvent are allowed to 
continue operating 
Government closes, 
merges, or restructures 
distressed financial 
institutions (-1) 
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Our primary banking crisis measure is from Reinhart and Rogoff (R&R), who 
provide the most comprehensive data on crises since the early nineteenth century 
(Reinhart, 2010; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). Their measure offers an expansive 
definition, identifying banking crises whenever there is any distress in the banking 
system. We focus only on identified episodes of systemic banking crises so as to 
investigate policy responses only in severe crises.12 We also consider a measure from 
Laeven and Valencia (L&V) (Laeven & Valencia, 2008, 2013). It extends from 1970 
to 2011, covering only systemic crises in nearly twice as many countries. We use both 
datasets to produce two sets of policy responses, using the R&R crisis dating for the 
pre-1970 period in both sets.  
We identify democracies using data from Boix, Miller and Rosato (Boix, 
Miller, & Rosato, 2014). Importantly, in addition to free and fair contestation, this 
dichotomous measure of democracy requires countries to meet a minimal suffrage 
requirement, defined as a majority of the male adult population — a criterion omitted 
from many alternatives such as the Polity dataset. In using this measure we aim to 
rule out possible objections that changing policy responses may be due to suffrage 
expansion alone. We also consider an alternative sample of democracies from the 
Polity dataset, following the convention of defining a country as democratic if its 
summary regime type score is above 6 during the crisis spell (Marshall, Gurr, & 
Jaggers, 2017).  
Our analysis begins with the raw data, with crisis start dates from 1848 to 
2008. We record responses to 38 crises in 17 democracies in the pre-1945 era.13 There 
are no systemic crises in the period 1945–1970, a period of unusual tranquillity. In the 
post-1970 era, we record responses to 54 crises in 41 democracies using the R&R 
measure, and 74 crises in 58 democracies using the L&V measure.   
 
 
 
                                                     
12
 Systemic and nonsystemic crises are distinguished in (Reinhart, 2010).  
13
 Unless otherwise stated, we rely on the Boix, Miller, and Rosato classification 
scheme.  
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Figure 6. Relative Frequency of Crisis Policy Responses, 1848 – 2008  
 
Figure 6, which plots the relative frequency of each of the policy response 
indicators, reports similar values for each dataset. It shows that Bank Restructuring 
and indiscriminate, uncollateralized, open-ended, or subsidized liquidity support are 
the two of the most commonly used policy responses since 1848, occurring in about 
80 percent and two-thirds of all crises respectively. It is notable that liquidity support 
going well beyond the Bagehot model was extended in crises during the gold standard 
era and in countries lacking central banks and possessing laws prohibiting liquidity 
provision by the government. Guarantees and public recapitalizations are also 
common policy responses following a crisis, occurring in about three-fifths and two-
thirds of cases respectively. Protection for depositors — either via the creation of new 
insurance arrangements or the extension of existing schemes — is the next most 
frequently observed response, featuring in nearly half of all crisis episodes, but with 
the exception of the United States during the Great Depression, was conspicuously 
absent in all other crises in the pre-1939 era. Public Asset Management features in 
about 40% of crisis episodes and is also largely a post-1970 phenomenon. Deposit 
freezes, bank holidays, and payment suspensions as well as deposit losses are 
relatively infrequent, occurring in one-fifth of crisis episodes.  
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Our argument leads us to expect governments to rely more heavily on bailout 
policy interventions during major crises after 1970 compared to the 1939 era. Figure 
7, which compares the relative frequency across both time periods for each of the 
policy response indicators, provides some supportive evidence, as do a series of 
difference of proportions tests. Post-1970 governments provided indiscriminate, 
uncollateralized, open-ended, or subsidized liquidity support, guarantees, and 
recapitalizations roughly twice as often as governments in the pre-1939 era.  As 
suggested earlier, the most striking difference is in the use of deposit insurance and 
public asset management measures, which with bank restructuring were used much 
more frequently in the post-1970 period. We find no significant differences for the 
remaining policy response indicators across the two time periods.    
 
 
Figure 7.  Relative Frequency of Crisis Policy Responses, Pre-1939 v. Post-1970 
 
Our data suggest that governments typically implement an array of responses 
to crises. For instance, open-ended liquidity support may be provided while a 
government restructures and closes insolvent banks. Bank restructuring and closures 
often take place alongside recapitalizations and guarantees. The raw data do not 
reveal such correlations and potentially exaggerate the dimensionality of the data. 
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Thus, our preferred measure of the overall tenor of government policy responses is 
the first principal component of our eight indicators. It indicates how policy responses 
co-vary as they move between the Market and Socialization poles, enabling us to 
assess the extent to which particular governments approximate Bagehot and Bailout 
ideal types.    
This index, constructed from the R&R crisis data, ranges from -2.59 to 2.52. 
Higher (lower) values of this index indicate more coherent Bailout (Bagehot) policies. 
The index generated from the L&V data ranges from -2.78 to 2.35. Our analysis of 
the R&R data shows that the first principal component is strongly correlated (in order 
of importance) with Recapitalization, indiscriminate, uncollateralized, open-ended, or 
subsidized Liquidity Support, Deposit Insurance and Public Asset Management; 
Guarantees have moderately high correlations. This suggests that these five policy 
indicators vary together. Deposit Freezes have almost no correlation with the first 
principal component. Not surprisingly, Bank Restructuring has a moderately high 
negative correlation and Deposit Loss a weakly negative correlation. The direction 
and magnitude for all the policy indicator correlations are broadly similar for the 
L&V data.   
This suggests that the first principal component can be viewed as a measure of 
the coherence of the Bailout response. The principal component scores that comprise 
our policy response index show that cases with positive scores will tend to have 
greater values on indicators associated with delaying the exit of clearly insolvent 
banks (Recapitalization, Extensive Liquidity, Deposit Insurance, Public Asset 
Management and Guarantees) and lower values for the indicators related to 
minimizing the taxpayer burden (Bank Restructuring and Deposit Losses). The 
opposite is the case for negative policy response index scores.   
Figures 8a and 8b plot the relationship between the average crisis policy 
response and the number of systemic banking crises for democracies since 1848, 
using the R&R and L&V data respectively. We find that bailout interventions before 
1945 were infrequent, whereas by the 1990s they had become the norm. Before 1945 
most of this small number of bailout cases are found in the interwar period, 
suggesting it was a transitional era, but one in which Bagehot responses were still 
dominant, representing roughly 70% of the 26 crisis episodes. For both datasets, the 
average measures of policy responses in the pre-war era (-1.06 on the R&R index, -
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1.21 on the L&V index) diverge substantially from those in the post-1970 period 
(1.37 and 1.15, respectively), with a difference of means that is statistically significant 
(t=9.23 and t=9.57, p<.001).  
 
Figure 8a.  Banking Crises Policy Responses, 1848 – 2008 – R&R Sample 
 
 
Figure 8b.  Banking Crises Policy Responses, 1848 – 2008 – L&V Sample 
 
 
This rising tendency for bailouts is consistent with our argument that 
governments have increasingly aimed to protect household wealth in crises. We 
observe a sharp departure from pre-war policy norms since the mid-1970s, especially 
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regarding government deposit insurance, public bank recapitalization and government 
assumption of distressed assets and debts. As Figure 7 showed, these critical features 
of bailout interventions were used prominently in the vast majority of post-1970 
systemic crises in democracies.   
3 Empirical Tests of the Argument  
 We now proceed to empirical tests of our argument, providing further detail 
on our data sources in the online appendix. We begin with the financialization of 
wealth and the rising stake of households in the stabilization of the market value of 
housing and financial assets. Since data on household asset ownership and wealth 
portfolio composition are unavailable over a long period, we instead use aggregate 
wealth data to assess this mechanism. 
For housing assets we utilize the level of residential property prices as it helps 
to capture the extent of housing equity wealth within a country.14 Higher property 
prices would suggest that households have more to lose if faced with a sudden 
evaporation of their property wealth, thus prompting more intense effective societal 
demand for intervention. We link two different national house price indices, setting 
base of the new consolidated series to 100 in 2010 (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2017a; Knoll, Schularick, & Steger, 2017).  
As regards financial wealth, we consider domestic deposits and ownership of 
DC pension assets. We measure the importance of household deposits using two 
different national series (Jordà et al., 2017; World Bank, 2017). Long run data on the 
size and composition of DC pension assets are unavailable. Instead, we use a range of 
sources to identify countries with mandatory DC scheme participation for all workers 
or for those in specified sectors (Brooks, 2005, 2007; OECD, International Social 
Security Association, & IOPS, 2008; International Organisation of Pension 
Supervisors, 2017; International Social Security Association, 2017). Following the 
OECD (2015), we also identify countries with “widespread” participation in voluntary 
                                                     
14
 We use nominal rather than real indices on grounds of practicality and because 
there is theoretical and empirical support for the view that most people think of asset 
prices in nominal rather than real terms (Brunnermeier & Julliard, 2008; Shafir, 
Diamond, & Tversky, 1997; Shiller, 2005, pp. 55–6). 
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DC schemes where coverage exceeded more than 40% of the working-age population, 
as well as countries with “limited” participation where coverage fell short of this 
threshold.  
Table 2 identifies the country and L&V crisis-years where exposure to DC 
pension assets was present based on these four arrangements. We use these data to 
create two alternative binary measures that capture different configurations of the 
above arrangements. One measure captures cases where DC asset holdings are wide-
ranging, with mandatory schemes or widespread voluntary participation. Another 
measure captures the presence of any of the above DC arrangements.    
 
Table 2.  DC Pension Scheme Arrangements 
Mandatory DC 
Scheme - All 
Workers15 
Widespread 
Voluntary DC 
Participation 
Mandatory DC 
Scheme - 
Sectoral 
Limited 
Voluntary DC 
Participation 
 
Argentina 1989 
Argentina 1995 
Argentina 2001 
Bolivia 1994 
Colombia 1998 
Denmark 2008 
Hungary 2008 
Sweden 2008 
Switzerland 2008 
Uruguay 2002 
 
 
Belgium 2008 
Germany 2008 
Iceland 2008 
Ireland 2008 
United Kingdom 
2007 
United States 1988 
United States 2007 
 
 
India 1993 
Thailand 1997 
 
Austria 2008 
Brazil 1990 
Brazil 1994 
Bulgaria 1994 
Costa Rica 1994 
Czech Republic 
1996 
France 2008 
Hungary 1991 
Hungary 2008 
Italy 2008 
South Korea 1997 
Luxembourg 2008 
Netherlands 2008 
Norway 1991 
Portugal 2008 
Slovenia 2008 
Spain 2008 
Thailand 1997 
Ukraine 2008 
 
 
                                                     
15
 Argentina (in 2008) and Bolivia and Hungary (in 2010) have since reversed their 
implementation of mandatory DC pension schemes.  
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Turning to the democratization of leverage, we use three different national 
series of household mortgage and consumer debt (Bank for International Settlements 
2017b; Jordà, Schularick, & Taylor, 2017; Léon, 2017).  
 Lastly, we wish to capture the extent to which governments have exhibited an 
accumulating ex ante effective commitment to financial stability as a policy priority. 
Our measure focuses on the most concrete forms of government pre-commitment: 
prudential regulation, the creation of financial regulatory agencies, and extensive state 
control of the banking system. We use the creation date of the first regulatory agency 
at the national level charged with responsibility for financial supervision or, 
alternatively, when the government took extensive control of the banking system.  We 
view these institutional innovations as clear and vivid manifestations of government 
commitments to voters to prioritize financial stability. For creation dates we draw 
largely on the regulatory agencies data from Jacint, Levi-Faur, and Fernández-i-Marín 
(2011). We supplement this, where necessary, with information from the websites of 
national central banks and financial regulatory agencies. We use other sources to 
identify government ownership of the banking system and extensive state control 
(Abiad, Detragiache, & Tressel, 2008; Honohan & Klingebiel, 2000).16  
 
  
                                                     
16
 The latter is defined as when state-owned institutions hold at least 50% of assets or 
75% of deposits.  
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Figure 9. Evolution of Government Policy Commitments since 1850 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the evolution of government policy commitments to financial 
stability since 1850.17 Notwithstanding a few exceptions (the United States in 1863, 
Sweden in 1907, and Denmark in 1919), as late as the early 1930s most democratic 
governments refrained from making a policy commitment. Then, from the mid-1930s 
onwards, we observe a sharp increase in the number of democracies committing to 
financial stability as a policy goal; by the end of the early post-war era, it was nearly 
universal.   
Our argument implies that voters in countries with a prolonged period of 
policy effectiveness will have higher expectations of financial stability than voters in 
countries in which stabilization commitments turn out to be a “false promise.” We 
thus develop a proxy measure of stronger policy commitment to financial stabilization 
based on a country’s history of effectiveness in avoiding financial instability. Our 
measure uses the date of first appearance of a commitment to financial stabilization as 
the baseline for counting the number of years since a country last experienced a 
                                                     
17
 We assume, once made, this commitment is not retracted by institutional change 
that relocates regulatory authority. 
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000
Year
Number of Countries with Policy Commitment Number of Democratic Countries
 30 
systemic crisis, with higher values indicating an accumulating effective policy 
commitment.   
Figure 10 plots the years of accumulated policy commitment for a sample of 
L&V crisis-years.  At the upper end of the distribution, we find crisis-years after a 
prolonged period of financial stability following the creation of a regulatory authority 
or statutory banking regulation (Austria 2008, Germany 2008, Denmark 2008, Japan 
1997, Sweden 1991) or an extended period of state control of the banking system 
(Lithuania 1995, Albania 1994, Poland 1992, Estonia 1992). At the lower end of the 
distribution, we observe crisis-years where either the country lacked a regulatory 
authority, statutory banking regulation, or extensive state control (Belgium 1934, 
France 1930, Canada 1923, Netherlands 1921) or it had experienced financial distress 
shortly after such commitment (Denmark, for instance, experienced a crisis in 1931 
and 1921 following creation of a regulatory authority in 1919). 
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Figure 10. Accumulated Years of Effective Policy Commitment 
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We control for degree of democracy using the Polity dataset because taxpayer 
interests may be better represented in regimes with stronger democratic institutions 
(Rosas, 2006). We also consider the level of economic development — the natural log 
of per capita GDP — and public debt burdens to account for the fiscal constraints on 
governments to afford the expense associated with banks bailouts. In some model 
specifications GDP per capita is highly correlated with the measures testing our 
argument. To avoid complications with multicollinearity, in these specifications we 
substitute a binary variable for “advanced economies” based on the IMF income 
classification scheme.18 Since fixed exchange rate commitments may also constrain 
the capacity of governments to undertake the fiscal and monetary measures associated 
with bank bailouts, we capture these using a binary variable. We include a measure of 
partisanship, coded as 1 = “Right,” 2 = “Center,” and 3 = “Left.” Finally, we include a 
common linear time trend to strip out the effect of unmeasured trending factors, such 
as technological change and the accumulation of economic knowledge concerning 
crisis mitigation, that could be shaping policy responses and also correlated with some 
of our independent variables.  
 We provide our sample, summary statistics, and correlation matrix in the 
online appendix. We estimate a series of ordinary least squares regressions that model 
government policy responses to banking crises and include robust standard errors with 
country clusters. Missing values pose some concern in this analysis. Banking crises 
are relatively rare events. The summary statistics show that partisanship exhibits a 
somewhat higher level of missingness. Inclusion of all the covariates above further 
depletes the already small number of crisis windows. We thus estimate both a 
reduced-form specification where partisanship is excluded and a more comprehensive 
specification where this variable included. Results are similar across both 
specifications.  
 The results provide strong confirmation of our argument. Table 3 reports the 
results from the larger sample of L&V crises; we provide the results from the R&R 
sample in the appendix. Figure 11 uses these results to provide a sense of the inter-
temporal and cross-sectional variation in the effects related to our argument. It uses 
                                                     
18
 Following Flandreau and Zumer (2004), we supplement this scheme by classifying 
Greece, Portugal and Spain as “emerging” during the pre-1945 era.  
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illustrative examples over time and across countries at given points in time to plot the 
simulated first difference for each variable related to our argument. 
Turning first to financialization, we find that more extensive bailouts follow 
crises in countries where residential property prices have reached elevated levels. The 
magnitude of the effect is substantively large, particularly over time as housing wealth 
has grown among the middle class. Based on an increase in property prices on the 
level experienced in the United States between the 1929 and 2008 crises (from 3.5 to 
129.8 on the index), we would expect a difference in the policy response index of 
1.84 [1.45, 2.26].19 We also find a greater tendency toward bailout (0.13 [0.085, 
0.173]) in countries with higher property prices even when comparing two economies 
in 2008 with elevated valuations (Hungary 108.1 and Ireland 140.5). 
                                                     
19
 95% confidence intervals are in brackets, binary covariates are set to zero, all other 
covariates are held constant at their means. 
 34 
Table 3. Great Expectations and Banking Crises Policy Responses, 1873 – 2008 – L&V Policy Index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Property Prices (ln) 0.500*** 0.497*** 
          
 
(0.0840) (0.0808) 
          
Deposits/GDP (ln) 
  
0.618** 0.636** 
        
   
(0.300) (0.288) 
        
DC Mandatory or 
Widespread 
    
0.913** 0.928** 
      
     
(0.374) (0.387) 
      
DC Any 
      
1.481*** 1.499*** 
    
       
(0.336) (0.332) 
    
Household Debt/GDP (ln) 
        
1.028*** 1.052*** 
  
         
(0.143) (0.136) 
  
Years Effective 
Commitment 
          
0.0271*** 0.0273*** 
           
(0.00533) (0.00548) 
Degree of Democracy 0.0122 0.00650 -0.0271 -0.0500 0.0911 0.0854 0.0462 0.0457 -0.0916 -0.0616 0.0719 0.0409 
 
(0.126) (0.126) (0.0837) (0.0907) (0.0687) (0.0719) (0.0667) (0.0674) (0.0869) (0.0856) (0.0669) (0.0707) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 
  
5.67e-05 0.000271 
        
   
(0.000322) (0.000354) 
        
Advanced Market 0.378 0.364 
  
-0.485 -0.464 -0.297 -0.264 -1.738*** -1.727*** -0.417 -0.440 
 
(0.631) (0.613) 
  
(0.359) (0.354) (0.347) (0.336) (0.386) (0.383) (0.261) (0.267) 
Public Debt/GDP (ln)  0.0714 0.0889 0.325 0.281 0.0163 -0.0306 0.0504 0.00784 0.551*** 0.537*** -0.0327 -0.0724 
 
(0.340) (0.341) (0.267) (0.262) (0.194) (0.187) (0.165) (0.161) (0.186) (0.193) (0.171) (0.170) 
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.360 0.361 0.0831 0.184 0.0675 0.160 -0.0706 0.00962 0.101 0.163 0.245 0.317 
 
(0.338) (0.342) (0.371) (0.372) (0.286) (0.293) (0.239) (0.246) (0.310) (0.318) (0.260) (0.272) 
Partisanship 
 
0.129 
 
0.311* 
 
0.337** 
 
0.345** 
 
0.123 
 
0.180 
  
(0.109) 
 
(0.159) 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.139) 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.114) 
Time Trend 0.000524 0.000651 0.00686** 0.00773** 0.00800*** 0.00875*** 0.00523* 0.00581** 0.00658* 0.00633* 0.00768*** 0.00854*** 
 
(0.00448) (0.00437) (0.00305) (0.00323) (0.00282) (0.00292) (0.00262) (0.00273) (0.00324) (0.00327) (0.00224) (0.00238) 
Constant -1.345 -1.581 -3.427** -3.846** -1.198 -1.730* -1.021 -1.620** -3.315*** -3.858*** -1.584* -1.604* 
 
(1.135) (1.260) (1.544) (1.519) (0.887) (0.997) (0.719) (0.795) (0.894) (0.967) (0.848) (0.910) 
             
Observations 48 48 95 93 104 102 104 102 67 66 104 102 
R-squared 0.706 0.709 0.213 0.245 0.203 0.232 0.305 0.335 0.546 0.565 0.366 0.381 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 11. Simulated First Differences 
 
Simulated values are derived from Models 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11.  
 
 
Higher property prices undoubtedly tap into the build-up of concentrated 
wealth in housing assets among middle class households, capturing aspects of the 
composition effect we discussed. Sharp falls in asset prices during crises can also 
quickly threaten highly exposed banks with insolvency, intensifying financial distress, 
generating additional wealth losses and prompting governments to respond with 
bailouts.  
 We also find that democratic governments have tended to move sharply away 
from the strict implementation of Bagehot policies when households have acquired a 
sizeable share of wealth stored in financial system deposits, demonstrative of the size 
effect we outlined above. Based on the more recent increase in deposit wealth in 
emerging market and developing countries, such as that experienced in Ecuador 
between its crises in 1982 and 1998 (13.4% to 23.3% of GDP), we would expect a 
difference in the policy response index of 0.35 [0.13, 0.58]. Alternatively, comparing 
Sweden (29.9%) and Finland (53.2%) in 1991, we also find a stronger tendency 
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toward bailouts in the country with greater deposit wealth (a difference in the policy 
response index of 0.57 [0.05, 1.12]). 
 Household exposure to DC pension scheme assets also heightens the 
likelihood that governments will intervene with more extensive bailouts, suggesting 
that the composition effect associated with housing assets extends to pension assets.  
Comparing over time and across countries, such as Denmark in 1931 versus 2009 and 
Venezuela versus Argentina in 1994/5, we find a large difference in the policy 
response index (1.89 [1.12, 2.67] and 1.47 [0.78,2.13]) where any of the four DC 
arrangements analysed are present. The results suggest that governments are highly 
responsive to growing household anxiety about the value of volatile pension assets 
following a crisis.  
 Governments also appear very responsive to rising household mortgage and 
consumer borrowing. An increase in household leverage equivalent to that 
experienced in the Netherlands between its 1921 and 2008 crises (14.5% to 109.7% of 
GDP), would lead us to expect a large difference in the policy response index (2.6 
[1.98, 3.16]). We even observe a substantively large difference when comparing two 
emerging market countries, Argentina (4.0%) and Czech Republic (9.5%), with 
limited household leverage in 1995/6. 
The democratization of leverage has been associated with more extensive 
bailouts, in all likelihood, due to government efforts to support consumption and to 
prevent “fire sales” of assets that would threaten household wealth and harm the 
wider economy. To avoid losing political support from households, the results suggest 
governments have become increasingly prone to public intervention to stabilize the 
financial system.   
Lastly, the results show that bailouts are more likely in democracies where 
voters have observed a longer effective policy commitment to financial stabilization. 
Comparing over time and across countries, such as Denmark in 1931 versus 1991 (8 
versus 69 years) and Philippines versus South Korea in 1997 (13 versus 46 years) we 
find a substantial difference in the policy response index (2.1 [1.4, 2.6] and 0.89 
[0.56, 1.21]) where the government has a longer effective policy commitment to 
financial stabilization.   
 37 
Our results are robust to the inclusion of time period dummies, IMF 
conditionality, capital openness, central bank existence, and spatial weights capturing 
policy diffusion via competition and learning as additional control variables. They 
hold up when we undertake cross-sectional analysis in a particular crisis period and 
when we consider a model approximating a difference-in-differences design (see 
online appendix). Taken together, these results suggest that the three interrelated 
developments we emphasize in our argument have shaped policy responses both over 
time and across countries at given points in time.  
Turning to our control variables, we also find some evidence that richer 
economies are more likely to choose Bailout policies, possibly reflecting their greater 
policy space to engage in taxpayer-funded financial rescues. We find little evidence 
that exchange rate commitments or public debt burdens constrain (or enable) 
particular policy responses. Lastly, we find no evidence to suggest that degree of 
democracy or partisanship drives government policy responses to crises. This is 
consistent with our argument that voters’ great expectations now overwhelm any 
constraints that partisanship and democratic institutions might impose.  
4 Conclusion  
The expectation that democratic politicians will seek to avoid extensive crisis 
interventions producing large taxpayer liabilities draws on a long tradition of 
theorizing about the impact of electoral accountability in democratic settings. 
However, the evidence in this paper raises doubts. Instead, it suggests that 
democratically elected politicians in the modern era have become increasingly prone 
to respond to the demands of an increasingly wealthy but also exposed middle class. 
These great expectations arise from the three interrelated developments — the 
financialization of wealth, the democratization of leverage, and an accumulating ex 
ante policy commitment to financial stability. We have shown that each of these 
factors is associated with more extensive bailouts. This was true not just for all the 
democracies that faced systemic banking crises over 2007–2009, but more 
importantly we show that it is part of a longer and deeper evolution of the political 
economies of developed, emerging and even developing countries.  
Our findings also point to the complex and evolving interest cleavages 
characterizing increasingly financialized political economies. Much political economy 
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theory has traditionally understood interest cleavages as deriving from actors’ 
positions in the division of labour and the way these shape flows of income to classes 
(capital, labour and rentiers) or to cross-class sectoral divisions (Frieden, 1991; 
Hiscox, 2002; Rogowski, 1990). Financialization, by linking the wealth and 
consumption of many households to asset and credit markets blurs this picture 
(Ansell, 2014; Gourevitch & Shinn, 2006, p. 221; Langley, 2009; Pagliari, Phillips, & 
Young, 2018). Income flows still matter to middle class households, defined (as we 
have throughout) as those comfortably out of poverty but still needing to work, but 
now these households as homeowners and DC pension-holders fret more about asset 
and credit market downturns. They often also value highly the ability to refinance 
mortgages and other debts at lower interest rates in the wake of financial crises, and to 
maintain consumption via expansion of consumer finance and credit. Others who are 
less leveraged (and often older) may be less exposed, but as likely to be concerned 
about the threat financial instability poses to the value of their pensions and houses.   
The implications of these new cleavages and coalitions defined by wealth 
rather than income are potentially far-reaching.  It has posed challenges to the 
contemporary welfare state and complicated efforts to forge constituencies in support 
of more redistributive measures after the 2007–2009 crisis (Ansell, 2012, 2014). It 
may also increase political support for consumption-driven growth models linked to 
the expansion of credit as opposed to export-driven models based on labour cost 
moderation and the real exchange rate (Baccaro & Pontusson, 2016). It may make it 
harder to build constituencies in favour of moderating housing and asset booms and 
the growth of private debt (Baker, 2018). Booming housing markets may also 
heighten the salience of political cleavages between home owners and renters, which 
are often layered on wealth disparities between generations and between those living 
in prime versus peripheral locations (Ansell, 2017). Home ownership may also have 
effects on political preferences for environmental protection, fuelling NIMBYism 
aimed at blocking liberalization of supply-side constraints on home construction that 
could lower house prices.  
Perceptive politicians such as Margaret Thatcher saw political advantage in 
policies promoting asset ownership among the working and middle classes (Francis, 
2012). But our evidence suggests that her attempt to drive a wedge through the left’s 
constituency and generate a permanent majority for pro-market conservatives was 
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only partly successful. The promotion of private house ownership and privatized 
pensions produced more extensive crisis interventions, consistent with the preferences 
of an increasingly asset-rich middle class. Their preferences may be time-inconsistent, 
favouring deregulation in credit booms and supporting heavy government intervention 
and re-regulation when crises strike. These interventions in turn may generate the 
rising moral hazard Thatcher so detested, destabilizing the market capitalism she and 
others sought to restore. Furthermore, in creating a policy trap that reinforces the very 
threat to financial stability from which many voters demand protection, it could 
increase political instability and contribute to rising citizen dissatisfaction with 
government and politics in many democracies (Chwieroth & Walter, 2017; Foa & 
Mounk, 2016, 2017). This link, which has been little explored to date in the 
burgeoning literature on populist politics, is worthy of further research. 
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